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N on-state	actors	often	have	more	 limited	military	 resources	than	the	states	against	which	they	fight	and,	therefore,	use	landmines,	“the	poor	man’s	weapon,”	more	frequently.	As	
a	 consequence,	 the	number	of	NSAs	using	 landmines	 significantly	
exceeds	the	number	of	states	deploying	this	weapon.
Around	60	NSAs	have	emplaced	landmines	in	2	countries	across	
five	 geographic	 regions:	 sub-Saharan	 Africa,	 Asia,	 Europe,	 Latin	
America	 and	 the	 Middle	 East/North	 Africa.2	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
NSAs,	armed	groups,	which	are	difficult	to	identify	as	belonging	to	
a	certain	category	of	ideology	or	organizational	form,	have	also	made	
frequent	 use	 of	 landmines	 in	 a	 few	 other	 countries.	 Two-thirds	 of	
these	 groups	 have	 deployed	 some	 type	 of	 victim-activated	 devices.	
These	 devices	 were	 both	 factory-made	 and	 handmade,	 indicating	
NSA	involvement	in	both	the	transfer	and	the	production	of	mines.
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume I: A Global Report 











mine	 use	 than	 are	 States	 Parties.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 however,	 that	
Armed	Non-state	Actors:	The	Main	Users	of	the	
by Anki Sjöberg [ Geneva Call ]
This report, which builds on the 2004 Geneva 
Call initial analysis,1 provides a comprehensive 
mapping of the use, acquisition, production, 
transfer and stockpiling of landmines by armed 
non-state actors through a presentation of 
individual group profiles and a global analysis. 
The report records global occurrences of anti-
personnel and anti-vehicle mine planting by 
NSAs during 2003–2005, whether activated 





Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	and	the	Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional,	operate	in	Colombia,	a	State	Party.
Frequency of Mine Use
Keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 differences	 in	 mine	 use	 among	 NSAs	 is	
crucial	in	choosing	the	most	appropriate	strategy	for	engaging	them	
in	 a	 mine	 ban.	 It	 is	 clear	 there	 are	 significant	 disparities	 between	
NSAs,	not	only	in	terms	of	the	reasons	that	motivate	their	mine	use	






of	 this	are	 the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	 in	Uganda,	 the	Abu	Sayyaf	
Group	 in	 the	 Philippines	 and	 the	 Rahanwein	 Resistance	 Army	 in	
Somalia.	 Some	 groups,	 such	 as	 the	Party	 for	 the	Liberation	of	 the	
Hutu	People–National	Liberation	Forces	in	Burundi	and	the	Sendero 
Luminoso	in	Peru,	are	sporadic	users.
Logic Behind NSA Mine Use
Although	 deemed	 by	 many	 as	 lacking	 decisive	 military	 utility	
and	despite	their	disastrous	humanitarian	consequences,	landmines	
clearly	 serve	 different	 purposes	 for	 each	 NSA	 that	 employs	 them.1	
Knowing	why	and	how	NSAs	use	these	weapons	could	contribute	to	





























TMAC,	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	
MLSPP,	 ICRC,	 UNDP,	 and	 RCS,	 organ-
ized	a	summer	camp	for	32	mine	survivors	





A	 regional	 conference,	 “Progress	 to-




International	 Centre	 for	 Humanitarian	
Demining.	 Official	 representatives	 of	 cen-







discussed	 the	 implementation	 process	 of	 the	
Ottawa	Convention	in	the	region	on	the	eve	






that	 Her	 Majesty	 Queen	 Noor	 of	 Jordan	
took	part	in	the	conference.
The	 official	 delegation	 of	 the	 Republic	
of	 Tajikistan	 took	 part	 in	 the	 First	 Review	
Conference	in	Nairobi	and	made	a	presenta-
tion	 about	 the	process	 of	 implementing	 the	
Ottawa	Convention.	TMAC	and	other	gov-
ernmental	representatives	continue	to	take	an	
active	 role	 in	 international	 conferences	 and	
meetings	 on	 the	 banning	 of	 anti-personnel	





In	 accordance	 with	 Article	 7	 of	 the	






The	 Civil	 War	 of	 the	 1990s	 created	 a	
mine/UXO	 problem	 for	 Tajikistan	 that	 is	
still	 threatening	 the	 daily	 lives	 of	 its	 citi-
zens	 a	 decade	 later.	 The	 Tajikistan	 Mine	
Action	Centre	is	remedying	the	devastating	
effects	 this	 problem	 has	 had	 on	 the	 coun-
try.	 TMAC,	 with	 international	 support,	
has	started	and	will	continue	to	make	huge	
strides	 in	 mine/UXO	 clearance,	 mine-risk	
education	and	victim	assistance.
See Endnotes, page 112
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Rigged Mine Blast Kills 64, Injures More
A powerful landmine blast ripped through a passenger bus loaded with commuters and schoolchildren in 
northern Sri Lanka in early June. The attack, attributed to the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (popularly known as the Tamil Tigers), killed more than 64 people and injured dozens more. 
Officials said many of the injured were bystanders not on the bus.
The explosion tore through the packed bus in a crowded part of Kabithigollewa, a town about 200 
kilometers (125 miles) north of the capital, Colombo. Military officials said the blast came from two 
landmines hanging from a tree and rigged to detonate when signaled from a remote position. Rigging mines 
above ground on trees and other structures is a common Tiger tactic to reduce blast shielding provided 
by the ground. The Tigers strongly denied responsibility for the attack after government officials 
assigned blame to the group. The bus bombing was the most violent act since a tentative ceasefire in 
2002 and brings the divided country even closer to total war.
 
The Sri Lankan Air Force responded later by bombing several rebel-held areas in other parts of the 
country. The Tigers are a separatist terrorist group seeking independence of certain areas from Sri 
Lanka and have been classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.
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also	 indiscriminate	 weapons.	 However,	
since	 NSAs	 in	 many	 conflicts	 largely	 de-
pend	on	these	weapons,	it	appears	unlikely	




Need for Prioritization 
When	engaging	NSAs,	priorities	must	be	
set	as	to	when	and	where	to	allocate	scarce	
resources:	 If	 humanitarian	 actors	 target	 a	
group	 that	 is	 a	 frequent	 user	 and	 manage	
to	 involve	 it	 in	 the	 mine	 ban,	 the	 benefits	
for	the	population	are	greater;	yet	a	sporadic	





use,	 intends	 to	 provide	 a	 background	 tool	
for	humanitarian	actors	to	strategize	regard-







group.	 In	 addition,	 understanding	 regional	





landmine	 problem	 or	 provide	 possibilities	
for	its	solution.
NSA Involvement in Mine Action 
Considering	 the	 disastrous	 effects	 of	
landmine	 use,	 there	 is	 a	 requirement	 for	
national	 and	 international	 agencies	 to	 un-
dertake	 mine	 action	 in	 areas	 where	 NSAs	
operate	and/or	are	in	control,	as	encouraged	
in	 Action	 6	 of	 the	 Nairobi	 Action	 Plan.	
Given	the	benefits	of	mine	action	to	affected	




notably	 in	 Sudan,	 Sri	 Lanka	 and	 Iraqi	
Kurdistan.	 In	 order	 to	 map	 the	 benefits	
and	 challenges	 related	 to	 the	 involvement	
of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 humanitarian	 dem-
ining	and	to	encourage	other	NSAs	to	ban	
anti-personnel	 mines	 and	 get	 involved	 in	
mine	action,	 there	 is	a	need	 to	 further	 in-
vestigate	 current	 mine-action	 efforts	 un-
dertaken	 by	 these	 actors	 in	 conflict	 and	
post-conflict	 situations.	 Geneva	 Call	 is	
currently	 working	 on	 such	 a	 report	 about	
NSA	mine	action.	In	fact,	the	Global Report	
is	 part	 of	 a	 bigger	project	 that	 studies	 the	
negative	and	positive	implications	of	NSAs	
in	the	landmine	problem.	This	project	grew	
out	 of	 the	 realization	 that	 only	 by	 under-
standing	 NSA-	 and	 region-specific	 dy-
namics	is	it	possible	to	address	the	current	

















using	 a	 victim-activated	 weapon.	 This	 sug-
gests	an	inclusive	approach—involving	advo-
cacy	based	on	accurate	information—could	
be	 the	 key	 to	 success	 for	 spreading	 a	 mine	
ban	among	NSAs.
This article is drawn from a report pro-
duced by Geneva Call, Armed	 Non-State	
Actors	 and	 Landmines, Volume	 I:	 A	
Global	 Report	 Profiling	 NSAs	 and	 their	
Use,	 Acquisition,	 Production,	 Transfer	
and	 Stockpiling	 of	 Landmines,2 which was 
published in November 2005. The report 
can be downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web 
site at http://www.genevacall.org. Hard copies 
can be obtained by writing to info@genevacall.org.
See Endnotes, page 112
“The humanitarian impact of NSA 
mine use is difficult to measure, since 
it takes place in a conflict situation, in 
areas where little or no mine action 
is taking place and where civilians 
may fear reporting mine incidents.”
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developing	 a	 successful	 strategy	 for	 engag-
ing	these	groups	in	the	landmine	ban.	Four	






Many	 NSAs	 use	 landmines	 in	 an	 of-
fensive	 manner;	 for	 example,	 the	 CPN-M	
in	Nepal,	the	Kurdistan	People’s	Congress/
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan	 (Kongra-Gel/
PKK)	 in	 Turkey,	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	
India–Maoist	 in	 India,	 and	 the	 Taliban	
in	 Afghanistan.	 However,	 offensive	 use	 is	
probably	significantly	over-reported	since	it	
is	more	visible.	
NSAs	 often	 confirm	 not	 only	 offensive	
but	 also	 defensive	 mine	 uses.	 Indeed,	 ac-
cording	 to	 a	 majority	 of	 NSAs,	 landmines	
are	 mainly	 utilized	 for	 defensive	 pur-
poses.	 The	 Burmese	 Rohingya	 Solidarity	
Organization	 has	 admitted	 to	using	mines	
to	defend	its	camps	and	bases	as	well	as	to	
protect	 its	 members	 from	 robbery	 or	 from	
the	Bangladeshi	Army.	The	Chin	National	
Front	(Burma/Myanmar)	has	also	admitted	
to	 using	 mines	 for	 self-defense,	 apparently	
to	protect	its	camps.	
Landmine	 use	 for	 economic	 purposes	
is	not	 frequently	 reported,	 although	 this	 is	
probably	due	to	underreporting	rather	than	
the	 insignificance	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 use.	 For	




Casamance	 in	 Senegal	 is	 thought	 to	 plant	
landmines	 to	 hinder	 the	 local	 population	
from	 benefiting	 from	 economically	 profit-
able	land.	
As	 for	 nuisance	 mining,	 the	 most	 cit-
ed	 example	 is	 probably	 that	 of	 the	 Lord’s	
Resistance	 Army.	 Nuisance	 mining	 is	 the	
use	 of	 mines	 that	 serve	 no	 direct	 military	
or	 economic	 purpose.	 This	 includes	 using	
mines	to	interfere	with	strategic	infrastruc-
ture,	such	as	communications	and	railways,	
or	 to	 affect	 civilians.	 Other	 examples	 are	
groups	 in	 Colombia	 and	 the	 Democratic	











mines	 may	 be	 an	 alternative,	 and	 hence,	 a	
total	ban	on	AP	mines	may	be	possible.		
There	 is	 currently	 a	 trend	 in	 many	
conflicts	towards	increased	use	of	command-
detonated	 mines.	 However,	 although	
command-detonation	 is	 clearly	 preferable	
from	 a	 humanitarian	 point	 of	 view	 to	 vic-
tim	 and	 vehicle	 activation,	 this	 does	 not	
constitute	 a	 guarantee	 that	 civilians	 and	
humanitarian	actors	will	not	be	victimized,	
as	became	evident	 in	 the	 tragic	 incident	 in	
Nepal’s	Chitwan	district	in	June	200.6
Widespread Production and Use 
of IEDs 
Around	 0	 groups	 globally	 produced	




cient.	 Easy	 access	 to	 materials	 necessary	 to	
manufacture	IEDs,	as	well	as	knowledge	and	
technology	 transfers	 among	 NSAs,	 has	 un-
doubtedly	contributed	to	spreading	the	land-
mine	 problem.	 Nevertheless,	 IEDs	 do	 not	
always	constitute	indiscriminate	weapons	as	
this	depends	on	how	they	are	put	to	use.












Burma/Myanmar.	 NSAs	 have	 also	 reported	
that	 soldiers	 from	 state	 armies	 have	 offered	
to	sell	them	landmines.	Furthermore,	foreign	





terial	 among	 NSAs.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 should	
be	noted	that	in	some	post-conflict	situations	





to	 each	other	not	only	 arms	 and	 explosives	










Impact of NSA Mine Use
The	impact	of	NSA	mine	use	is	in	many	
respects	similar	to	the	impact	of	state	mine	





use	 is	 difficult	 to	 measure,	 since	 it	 takes	
place	in	a	conflict	situation,	in	areas	where	
little	or	no	mine	action	is	taking	place	and	
where	 civilians	 may	 fear	 reporting	 mine	
incidents.	 In	 addition,	 the	 humanitarian	
impact	 of	 NSA	 mine	 use	 is	 difficult	 to	
distinguish	from	that	of	the	conflict	itself	
until	 the	conflict	has	ended	and	 informa-
tion	 becomes	 available	 through	 mine-ac-
tion	efforts.	The	impact	of	former	mine	use	
by	NSAs	(anti-personnel	and	anti-vehicle)	
“There is currently a trend 
in many conflicts towards 
increased use of command-
detonated mines.”
2
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